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I. Media, Scale, and the Elision of Representation   
Modern political theory connects the legitimacy of democratic rule to the capacities of 
citizens to exercise reasonable political judgement through the medium of public 
communication (Ferree et al 2002). In assessing this relationship, a number of 
commentators identify the media as bearing primary responsibility for the decline of 
active citizenship and the decay of democratic trust. The media has encouraged 
cognitive dependence, narcosis, and the attenuation of critical faculties (Zolo 1992); it 
has eroded the capacity of citizens to trust in public institutions and hold them 
accountable (O’Neill 2002); it has undermined the autonomy of science and a robust 
public culture of criticism (Bourdieu 1998); it has led to widespread civic 
disengagement and the withering of social capital (Putnam 1995). One variant of 
these melodramatic narratives of the decline of democracy is the argument that the 
acceleration of processes of mediated communication and information transfer 
overwhelms the capacity for reasoned debate and discussion. The speeding-up of 
communications leads to the rhythm of deliberate, deliberative judgement being 
replaced by spectacular display and appeals to emotion. There is a counter argument 
that holds that the acceleration of communication is the very essence of the 
democratising potential of new media technologies. Electronic town halls, on-line 
democracy, and instant referenda are all seen as providing problem-free, value-neutral 
means for more participation and better, more direct political expression. In this 
argument, increasing speed is used to signify the overcoming of distance, both 
literally and metaphorically, in the sense of transcending social division and political 
delegation. Technology is presented as having the potential to alleviate socio-
economic inequality and political divisions by virtue of its apparent ability to 
transcend the materialities of space and time. This rhetoric extends beyond corporate 
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marketing strategies. It informs the communitarian left-liberalism of “the third way” 
(Leadbetter 2000), which embraces a communicative idealisation of globalisation to 
present whole sets of political and policy positions as obsolete. And it also 
underwrites the millenarian ultra-leftist optimism of Hardt and Negri’s best-selling 
Empire (2000), in which a planetary capitalist system with media and information at 
its heart is imagined to be prone to incessant de-stabilisation by myriad local 
insurgencies that are immediately transmitted world-wide through its own networks of 
publicity. 
 Each of these political visions assumes that political issues can be reduced to 
problems of more or less effective communication. The celebration of new 
technologies like the Internet as ideal for direct, plebiscitary democracy, or for the 
proliferation of subterranean resistance networks assumes that democracy is primarily 
about the expression of personal preferences or group interests outside of any context 
of transformative, deliberative justification (Sunstein 1992). They combine an 
unquestioned ideal of individual autonomy with an unquestioned norm of singular 
will. It is essential to confront the persistent elision of the problem of representation 
that characterises celebrations of the immediacies of new technologies. The 
stretching-out and speeding-up of communication does not do away with the 
normative issues of delegation, authorisation, trust, and accountability that define 
modern understandings of democratic rule (Barnett 2003). Moving beyond populist 
clichés requires us to rethink the plasticity of space and time. Time and space are not 
compressible forms moving towards a teleologically determined vanishing point. 
Communications technologies do not therefore obliterate time and space. They re-cast 
the organisation of the spatial and temporal scenes of social life. This chapter sketches 
the outlines of an alternative conceptualisation of the relations between the 
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geographies of communication and democratic public life, one that rests on two 
related propositions: that space is produced, and that scale is networked.  
 
II. Communications and Spatial Formations of Public Life   
To approach the relationship between communications and the plasticity of space and 
time in a more productive way, it is useful to consider the work of three very different 
writers, John Dewey, Harold Innis, and Raymond Williams. Taken together, these 
three sketch the basis for a nuanced understanding of the formative relationships 
between time, space, communications and public life. Dewey’s progressive social 
liberalism understood democracy in a very broad sense, as a mode of associational 
living shaped by openness to new experience. He argued that the material 
transformations of communications laid down the possibility of an expanded public 
life. Dewey’s definition of the public combines an emphasis upon self-transformation 
with a focus upon instrumental and purposive collective action. A public involves 
“conjoint, combined, associated action” that addresses the problem of how to control 
certain phenomena: “publics are constructed by recognition of extensive and enduring 
indirect consequences of acts” (Dewey 1927: 47). The emergence of publics is 
intimately tied to the material organisation of space and time through networks of 
economic trade, migration, and transport. A public only emerges through a degree of 
abstraction from social contexts of face-to-face interaction, when the extent to social 
life requires combined action to address issues that stretch beyond the scope of small 
communities. Dewey’s diagnosis of the eclipse of the public turned on the 
contradictory relationship he discerns between the pluralisation of publics necessary 
to address the complexity of modern life, and the imperative for some co-ordination 
and channelling of this plurality to enable effective public action. The creation of 
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democratic state at a continental scale during the nineteenth-century was tied together 
socially and politically through “railways, travel and transportation, commerce, the 
mails, telegraph and telephone, newspaper” (ibid: 113). But continuing economic 
development meant that the scope of indirect consequences has become so intensified, 
complicated, and extensive that the ability of citizens to perceive and know them, 
rather than simply feel and suffer them, has been undermined. There was now, Dewey 
argued, “too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in 
composition” (ibid: 137).  
 For Dewey, the eclipse of the public is not merely a matter of functional 
diversification, spatial and temporal extension, and epistemological complexity. The 
proliferation and fragmentation of publics is associated with the increase in the 
amount of distracting amusements in the form of movies, radio, and cheap transport. 
The main problem, for Dewey, with modern popular culture is that it encourages 
forms of identification that are shifting and unstable. In creating the conditions for an 
expanded public, capitalist industrialism has also facilitated excessive geographical 
mobility and encouraged a flourishing of cheap and accessible popular culture that 
together undermined the stable conditions required for a public to come into existence 
(ibid: 140-141). This evaluation reveals an understanding of communication as a 
medium for the sharing of meanings, one that overcomes divisions and brings life to 
the deadened materiality of physical means of transmission (ibid: 184). The ideal of 
communication stands as a norm of shared understanding and mutually beneficial 
self-activity that transcends the divided world of capital and labour. The 
transcendence of the social relations of capital and labour in Dewey’s philosophy 
underwrites the image of a “great society” being reconstituted as a self-governing 
public of shared interest through the medium of educative communication.  
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Like Dewey, the work of Canadian political economist Harold Innis was 
focused upon the formative relationships between the patterns and meanings of social 
life. The central theme in Innis’ theory of communication is that of “bias”. This refers 
to two elements, one related to experience, one related to knowledge. Firstly, Innis 
proposed that particular technologies emphasise a certain aspect of experience, either 
time or space. Secondly, different communications technologies favour centralisation 
or decentralisation, hierarchical or egalitarian distributions of power, and open or 
closed systems of knowledge. The bias of communication is therefore determined by 
the extent to which a particular medium favours extension in space or duration over 
time (Innis 1951). Innis developed a political phenomenology of communications, in 
which certain dimensions of experience were associated with particular patterns of 
power relations. This argument rested on a strong evaluative opposition between the 
space-binding technologies of control and time-binding technologies of shared 
understanding. The former enables the spatial extension of interactions, but are 
associated with the pre-eminence of instrumental knowledge and bureaucratic rule. 
Innis sees in the history of modern communications a steady ascendancy of space-
binding technologies, which enlarge the scales of social organisation, and in so-doing, 
enhance the potential for the monopolisation and centralisation of control (Innis 
1950). The main thrust of Innis’ critique is that modernity is overwhelmingly biased 
towards the spatial over the temporal. This spatial bias of modern communications in 
turn undermines the ritual, meaningful character of social life. The spatial or temporal 
bias of communications is also strongly culturally coded. Spatially biased media such 
as writing, printing, and more recently photography, emphasise visuality over orality, 
the eye over the ear, and space over time (Innis 1951: 130-131). New popular cultures 
based on mechanisation are dominated by an ethos of ephemerality and superficiality, 
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in order to appeal to the large numbers of people that spatially extensive markets 
demand (ibid: 82-83).  
In contrast to Innis, one might consider the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
social processes as being intimately related rather than diametrically opposed. One 
such revision is Anthony Giddens’ account of time-space distanciation as a medium 
of modern power relations. This refers to the ways in which social life and social 
systems are stretched by different mediums (money, commodities, and writing), 
which re-articulate relations of spatial and temporal presence and absence. Time and 
space are not understood as neutral mediums for social and system integration, but as 
plastic configurations whose forms are inherently related to the constitution and 
transformation of relations of power, exploitation, and domination (Giddens 1984: 
256-262). As a modality of time-space distanciation, print-writing is crucial to 
modern state-formation. It facilitated the centralisation of national authority, through 
uniform codes of law and administration and a uniform vernacular language; and the 
decentralisation of national administration, as a mobile and easily reproducible means 
of communication. The example of modern state-formation therefore revises Innis’ 
one-dimensional analysis of power and knowledge. Far form simply extending the 
coercive capacities of centralised authorities, the spatial extension of modern power 
through communicatively mediated time-space distanciation depends upon the 
development of innovative forms of reciprocal social relations, expressed in the 
struggle for the extension of modern practices of representative citizenship.  
 Furthermore, the cultural dimension of Innis’ account is also called into 
question by considering processes of state-formation. It is now a commonplace that 
the formation of modern nation-states needs to be understood as having a cultural 
dimension in addition to administrative and coercive elements. The most influential 
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cultural theory of nation-state formation and nationalism is Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities (1983). For Anderson, communities are distinguished not by 
their degree of authenticity, but according to “the style in which they are imagined” 
(ibid: 6). What defines modern nationalism, from this perspective, is that it is a mass 
mediated form of social interaction that combines distinctive forms of public culture 
with private practices. Anderson’s theory cuts across the conceptual oppositions of 
ritual and information that underwrites Innis’ analysis of the bias of communication. 
Newspapers are certainly a means of transmitting information, but they are also 
embedded in practices of ritual sharing, which enable the emergence of new sense of 
self based on imagining oneself to be engaged in the same activity as anonymous and 
absent others at the same time. By folding ritual and transmission together in the 
notion of communicative style, Anderson emphasises that symbolic meaning and 
control are not opposed dimensions of communicative practice (see also Carey 1989: 
13-36). The power-effects ascribed to space-binding communications by Innis are not 
alien to time-binding communications, and nor are space-binding technologies 
necessarily as inimical to social reciprocity as he suggested.   
In contrast to Innis’ somewhat mechanical materialism, Raymond Williams 
shared with Dewey a strong emphasis on the constitutive relationships between 
pattern and meaning that distinguish different configurations of communications. 
What is distinctive about Williams’ approach to cultural analysis is that it focused 
upon the ways in which different social contexts are differentiated by the forms of 
connection and relation through which social life is made to hang together. His work 
is informed by a strong sense that experience is plastic, not shaped by the content of 
media, but determined by the variable forms of connections with others and the world. 
Williams’ histories of cultural institutions are guided by a democratic ethos of 
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inclusive communication. This communicative imagination is at one and the same 
time an empirical entry point for the analysis of cultural practices, but it also doubles 
up as an evaluative framework, using norms of communication to judge different 
practices according to their adherence to principles of equal participation in a multiple 
range of communicative practices.  
 An example of this focus upon the production of the forms and configurations 
that shape social experience is Williams’ elusive notion of mobile privatisation. This 
refers to the double movement of localisation of social interactions into the regulated 
spaces of the domestic sphere, and an accompanying imperative for new kinds of 
contact, a movement that Williams diagnosed as being characteristic of the social 
changes wrought by new communications technologies in the twentieth century 
(1974: 26). There is in this idea the kernel of an essentially geographical 
conceptualisation of radio and television, in so far as Williams approaches media as a 
set of institutionalised practices that organize and giving meaning to the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of modern social life (see Moores 1993). The dominant sense of 
Williams’s usage of mobile privatisation is, however, of a movement away from 
engaged forms of public association, and an extension of a private attitude (Williams 
1989: 171). But one can just as easily argue that the re-articulation of spaces and 
mobilities might extend publicness into new areas, not least that of the home, so 
fundamentally transforming the meaning of what counts as public. Detached from a 
melancholic analysis of modernity, the notion of mobile privatisation directs attention 
to the ways in which cultural technologies bring individuals and groups into contact 
with people, places and events that are distant, enabling identifications with dispersed 
communities of interest, affiliation, and feeling.  
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Dewey, Innis, and Williams belong to a broader line of modern thought that 
understand time and space to be constructed through human practice. They each 
develop understandings of media and communications in terms of the variable 
formation of the dimensions of public life, combining an emphasis on new forms of 
sociability with new forms of concerted action. However, in each of these thinkers, 
new patterns of association are evaluated by reference to the idealized being-in-
common of a genuine community, so that the innovative idea that modernity is shaped 
by the changing spatio-temporality of communications is expressed in an idiom of 
loss. With this in mind, the next section considers less melancholic considerations of 
the public-forming qualities of modern communications.    
 
III. Media Publics and Spaces of Interaction 
The dis-embedding and re-embedding of institutions and interactions over extended 
times and spaces imply that there is a distinctive phenomenology of mediated public 
culture. The building blocks of experience are shaped by temporal and spatial 
configurations of communications media, understood in the broadest sense. As 
already noted, there is a long tradition that points to the ways in which media 
technologies enable new forms of integration over expanded spatial scales. The 
paradigm of this understanding is the rise of print capitalism and print culture. The 
combination of low cost, high durability, and high mobility accounts for the cultural 
impact of print in re-shaping culture and politics over extended scales, typically that 
of the territorial nation-state. The capacity of print media to detach symbolic forms 
from local contexts and re-inscribe them in new contexts depends on the physical 
transportation of material objects over material infrastructures. Nationalism, as a 
cultural form, is a product not just of newspapers and novels, but also of postal 
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systems and railways. This doubled sense of communication and transport is captured 
in human geographers’ research on time-space convergence, understood as a function 
of improving transport efficiency that progressively overcomes the friction of distance 
(see Brunn and Leinbach 1991).  
Telecommunications and broadcasting mark a decisive break with previous 
communications media. They cannot be easily contained within the paradigms 
developed around print culture precisely because of the distinctive relationship 
between communication, infrastructure, and transportation that distinguishes them. 
Beginning with the advent of the telegraph, communication is detached from the 
transportation of tangible objects over space (Carey 1989: 203-4). Electronic 
communications technologies uncouple time and space, so that the transmission of 
information or symbolic forms over space can take place without the physical 
transportation of objects (Thompson 1995). Thus, spatial transportation is no longer 
dependent on temporal distanciation, giving rise to the sense of immediacy associated 
with the telephone, radio, television, and now the Internet. And the flip side of the 
reduction of transmission time to close to zero is that the experience of simultaneity is 
detached from conditions of shared spatial locale with persons or events. This 
accounts for the distinctively modern experience of despatialized simultaneity (ibid.), 
referring to the way in which the experience of “now” is detached from shared 
locales, and how the sense of “distance” is detached from physical movement and 
travel. Both are now shaped by the available means of communication. This suggests 
that media forms re-articulate of spaces of public and private action. They extend 
“presence-availability” beyond contexts of physical proximity and the immediate 
corporeal limits of the body (Giddens 1984: 122). As such, electronic media and 
communications produce virtual spaces of “para-social” interaction, characterised by 
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more or less rudimentary forms of co-presence (see Samarajiva and Shields 1997). 
This leads beyond a consideration of communications networks solely in terms of 
conduits for the transmission of information, redirecting attention to the distinctive 
forms of communicative action and subjectivity that different mediums open up 
(Hillis 1998).  
 This conceptualisation of the time-space constitution of public communication 
is particularly important in understanding the role of cultural technologies in 
constructing modern meanings of the home as both a public and private space. Radio 
and television are amongst a range of domestic technologies through which the 
process of mobile privatisation has been sustained. Broadcasting in particular has 
been pivotal in re-shaping relationships between public and private: “broadcasting 
redefined the geography of public and private, relocating a new version of public 
sphere within the privacy of the domestic” (Donald 1992: 82-83). The scrambling of 
categorical divisions between private domesticity and public life accounts both for the 
centrality of gendered meanings in shaping the development of broadcasting, but also 
for the broader role of broadcasting as a technology for gendering public life in 
particular ways (Lacey 1996). The gendered inscription and re-inscription of public 
and private space through cultural technologies such as radio and television requires a 
revision of highly abstract, rationalist understandings of the grounds through which 
proper public action and political mobilisation should be conducted. Paddy Scannell 
presents broadcasting as a means by which modern life has been re-enchanted and 
made meaningful, acting as a medium for the “re-personalization” of public life 
(1996). The characteristic “for-anyone-as-someone” structure of the communicative 
process of radio and television re-personalises public life according to norms of 
sociability, sincerity, and authenticity: “[b]roadcasting transposes the norms of 
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everyday interpersonal existence into public life” (ibid: 172). Private life and public 
events are now intermingled in new spatialities, and public life is as much about 
pleasure and enjoyment as reason, information, and education.  The saliency of public 
events must accord with the rhythms and norms of everyday life: “The world, in 
broadcasting, appears as ordinary, mundane, accessible, knowable, familiar, 
recognisable, intelligible, shareable and communicable for whole populations. It is 
talkable about by everyone” (Scannell 1989: 152). By rendering public life accessible 
to all, broadcasting cultivates a form of reasonable subjectivity, characterised by a 
willingness to listen and openness to other viewpoints that is essential to the 
maintenance of a shared public life. On this account, popular media culture is 
embedded in wider social transformations through which the virtues required to 
engage in public life are re-ordered around a set of traditionally feminine-coded 
competencies (Hartley 1996).  
The distinctive phenomenology of broadcasting culture suggests that the 
“where” of public life needs to be rethought in terms of the spaces opened up by 
spatially extensive networks of media communication. This implies a fundamental 
transformation in the norms of public action and conduct. Samuel Weber notes that 
mediated communication is stretched out across three locations: the place from where 
images and sounds are recorded and produced; the places where they are received; 
and the spaces in-between, through which images and sounds are transmitted (Weber 
1996: 117). This sense of the space in-between through which any communication 
must pass points towards the fact that the experience of “despatialized simultaneity” 
depends on putting in place a complex material infrastructure that enables the 
uncoupling of time and space. Communications technologies do not overcome 
distance and separation, they render them invisible. The experience provided by radio 
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and television is divided across multiple spaces and times, and extended beyond the 
immediate emplacement of the sensuous body. This implies that the unity of place as 
the site of experience is shattered, and “with it the unity of everything that defines its 
identity with respect to place: events, bodies, subjects” (ibid: 125). The geographies 
of modern media practices therefore require a reassessment of the normative value 
ascribed to values of identity, authenticity, and place in both ethics and politics, 
suggesting instead a practical philosophy of dissemination and displacement (Peters 
1999). 
The distanciated geographies of mediated public intimacy associated with 
radio and television directs analysis to the ways in which different media enable 
caring and moral action to be extended across time and space. As Bruce Robbins 
(1999) observes, the main lesson Anderson’s theory of imagined communities 
discussed earlier is that the scale of human feeling is dependent on the variable 
institutionalisation of technologies and social organisations. The forces that once 
stretched and embedded culture at the national scale might well now be “steering it 
beyond the scale of the nation” (ibid: 21). Robbins point outs the crucial role of media 
institutions in mobilising what he calls “global feeling”, and is keen to avoid the 
tendency to present mediated forms of identification as modes of alienated, vacuous 
attachment by virtue of the intercession of distance. There is a particular ethical and 
political stake in insisting that proximity and distance not be thought of in terms of an 
opposition between concrete presence and alienating absence. This opposition allows 
media technologies to be both chastised for fostering inauthentic forms of 
identification and celebrated for reconstituting a lost sense of community. In contrast 
to both of these judgements, the dependence of patterns of interaction, identification, 
and subjectivity upon particular configurations of temporally and spatially mediated 
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communication should be treated as the basis for a social theory of the flexible spatial 
and temporal formation of trust, interest, empathy, belonging, and care which does 
without the consolations of idealized images of community and communication 
(Silverstone 1999).  
 The social-theoretic phenomenologies of media culture discussed in this 
section underscore the ways in which the dimensions and meanings of public life are 
shaped by the spatial and temporal relationships opened up by media practices. There 
is still, however, in the work reviewed here, a persistent tendency to conceptualise 
space as a gap or a distance bridged by different media, indicated by recourse to a 
“grammar of interaction” (see Gregory 1994: 117-119). The focus upon the 
interactional potentials opened up by different media tends to underplay the 
significance of the production of the material infrastructures that enable 
communication. With this in mind, the next section re-connects the interactional 
dimensions of communications to the temporal and spatial dynamics underwrite the 
production of communicative spaces under conditions of generalised 
commodification. 
 
IV. The Production of Communicative Spaces  
I want to suggest that it is necessary to supplement the grammar of interaction that 
underwrites mainstream media and communications studies with an analysis of the 
organisational, economic, and politically determined production of the material 
infrastructures of space and time. This task might draw fruitfully on David Harvey’s 
analysis of the production of capitalist spatiality. Harvey explicitly challenges 
conceptualisations of space understood in terms of the friction of distance, or as a gap 
to be overcome. Instead, the contradictory relationships between fixity and mobility 
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are central to Harvey’s geographical imagination. According to his argument, space 
and time are not progressively overcome, they are perpetually reconfigured. 
Harvey conceptualises how the production of space opens up new possibilities for 
interaction and circulation only by laying in place fixed material and organisational 
infrastructures that are characterised by their own forms of inertia. In Harvey’s 
account, capitalism is driven by a contradiction between investments made at one 
point in time and the imperative to devalue these during crises of overaccumulation 
(Harvey 1982). In this narrative, a series of communications innovations (turnpikes, 
canals, railways, the telegraph, telecommunications) reduce the costs of circulating 
commodities, labour, money – value – through space and time. The more capitalism 
develops, the more it embeds tendencies to geographical and temporal inertia: it takes 
a specific organisation of space to annihilate space; and it takes capital of long 
turnover time to facilitate the more rapid movement of the rest. The material and 
organisational mediums through which space and time are co-ordinated eventually 
come to serve as a brake for the further expansion and speed-up of accumulation, 
leading to a reorganisation of spatial and temporal configurations. The recurring 
theme in this conceptualisation is the contradictory process of creative destruction 
through which the material configurations of accumulation laid down in one period of 
development are transformed in a subsequent period of crisis. 
Harvey’s conceptualisation of the crisis-dependent dynamics of the production 
of capitalist spatiality is linked to an analysis of socio-cultural change and political 
mobilisation. Innovations in the means of communication not only enable new phases 
of capital accumulation, but they are also associated with new political forms, new 
forms of cultural expression, and new forms of social experience (Harvey 1990). 
There is an implicit phenomenology of modernity in this understanding of capitalist 
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space, one most clearly expressed in the notion of “time-space compression” (Harvey 
1989). This should not too readily be assimilated to other, similar sounding formulae, 
such as time-space convergence or time-space distanciation, precisely because it is 
derived from a conceptual analysis that explicitly breaks with friction-of-distance 
understanding of time and space implied in both those other notions. Time-space 
compression refers to the idea that the expression of crisis in periodic restructuring of 
the spatial and temporal configurations of everyday life disrupts stabilised patterns of 
meaningful social action. Crisis at one level of a social totality is mediated through 
the changing material dimensions of space and time, triggering changes in structures 
of cultural expression and consciousness that are also experienced in crisis-mode.  
 Compared to the accounts of spatiality and temporality discussed earlier in this 
chapter, Harvey’s conceptualisation of the production of space is more sensitive to the 
ways in which the restructuring of communications involves both the convergence 
and divergence of differentially situated actors. This emphasis has been most fully 
developed in critical elaborations that have challenged Harvey’s implication that 
material transformations in communications lead to a uniform shift in modes of 
consciousness. Doreen Massey (1994) argues that greater attention should be paid to 
the power-geometry of contemporary spatial and temporal restructuring. This refers to 
the ways in which groups and individuals are differently located in relations to flows, 
interconnections, and mobilities. Processes of time-space compression are socially 
stratified by class, gender, race and ethnicity, and other unequal social relations. 
Placement within these relations will define crucial differences in degrees of 
movement and interaction, and differences in the forms and degrees of power 
deployed in relation to such networks (Bridge 1997; Kirsch 1995, Leyshon 1995).   
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 Harvey’s analysis of the contradictory imperatives of fixity and mobility in 
shaping the landscapes of capital accumulation is particularly appropriate to the case 
of media and communications, because of the extent to which the commodification of 
these sectors depends upon the putting in place of complex material and 
organisational infrastructures through which expanded circulation can take place (see 
Mosco 1996). The low incremental costs of media reproduction leads to an imperative 
to expand market share as the easiest avenue of expanding profitability and extending 
accumulation. However, this imperative to expand circulation is dogged by the 
problem of maintaining the economic scarcity of commodities that are durable and 
easy to reproduce. These contradictory tendencies, between the drive towards 
expanding market share and extending the spatial scope of markets on the one hand, 
and the difficulty of maintaining price-regulated scarcity on the other, mean that the 
development of media and communications is shaped by a double imperative of 
circulation and containment (Gaines 1991). The expansion and deepening of the 
spatial scope of media commodity production depends on containing the circulation 
of media commodities within formal boundaries of commodity-exchange. 
Understanding media commodification in terms of the double movement of 
circulation and containment requires an acknowledgement of the extent to which the 
constitution of modern media publics has historically depended upon the political and 
cultural construction of private property rights in various media products (Lury 1993). 
The key point is that, historically, this process has embedded cultural technologies at 
particular scales, primarily those of the nation-state. But this contingent stabilisation, 
while facilitating commodification and patterns of accumulation in one period, has 
gradually come to serve as a restriction on further accumulation. Thus, from the 
interpretation developed above, the development of new media such as satellite 
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television, video, the Internet, the Walkman, and mobile telephony can all be 
understood as having been motivated by an explicit aim to re-order the stable national 
regimes of policy and regulation that have historically shaped broadcast radio and 
television cultures, in order to facilitate the deepening and widening of the scope of 
media commodification. But it is important to underscore the point that 
commodification is not something that befalls modern, democratic public culture from 
the outside. The spatial politics of media commodification is central to the 
construction and contestation of different understandings of publicness. What is more, 
it should not be supposed that genuine public life is best contained within one 
particular geographical scale. This means that predominant approaches to media 
citizenship need to be rethought.   
 
V. Rethinking the Spatiality of Media Citizenship 
Media citizenship is defined according to overlapping rights to information, rights to 
receive and register opinions, and rights to fair and diverse representation. This raises 
a set of questions concerning the structuring of access to material resources (money, 
free-time), symbolic resources (languages, idioms, meanings), and social resources 
(membership of social relationships, or social capital) necessary for participation in 
the cultural practices (Murdock 1994, Garnham 1999). The importance of the concept 
of media citizenship is that it moves beyond binaries between production and 
consumption, textual meaning and creative use, to focus upon the institutional 
dimensions through which cultural value is produced, reproduced, and contested. The 
theme of media citizenship was initially developed in relation to debates about the 
future of national media and cultural policies. Normatively, it is an idea that implicitly 
presumes that citizens’ access to cultural resources is spatially congruent with the 
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scale of formal political participation at the national scale. Over the last two decades, 
stabilised patterns of national regulation of media and communications have been 
transformed. As suggested in the last section, the restructuring of corporate ownership 
and market control, the development of new communications technologies, the 
increasing convergence of computing, telecommunications, and media, and the 
reorganization of the scales at which regulatory and policy decisions are made – these 
can all be understood as being driven by the imperative to produce new material and 
institutional infrastructures for the extension of capital accumulation over larger 
spatial scales at accelerated pace.  
  The most sustained consideration of the relationships between the changing 
scales of media economies and the possibilities of democratic citizenship is the work 
of Nicholas Garnham.  His interpretation of globalisation is premised on the 
assumption that the territorial scope of political and economic power must be matched 
by the territorial scope of a singular universal media public. The public sphere 
concept, he argues, necessarily implies a strong concept of universality, understood in 
a procedural sense as a minimum set of shared discursive rules necessary for 
democratic communication (see Garnham 2000). On these grounds, globalisation is 
seen as leading to a disempowering fragmentation of the public sphere. From the 
assumption that democratic citizenship requires a singular and universal public sphere 
coterminous with the territorial scale at which effective political power is exercised, 
Garnham (1997: 70) deduces that “the process of cultural globalisation is increasingly 
de-linking cultural production and consumption from a concrete polity and thus a 
realizable politics”. Conceptually, Garnham’s argument runs together an assumption 
about the spatial scope of power, which he considers to be universal on the grounds 
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that capitalism is now a global system, with an argument for a universal set of norms 
embodied in a singular institutional structure of mass media (Garnham 1993).  
Garnham’s evaluative opposition between the ideal of a universal and singular 
public sphere versus pluralistic fragmentation depends upon an unquestioned 
assumption that political power is naturally territorialized. This presumes that the key 
issue in assessing globalisation is determining the most appropriate territorial scale at 
which power should be subjected to democratic oversight. An alternative is to think of 
debates about globalisation as the occasion for reassessing how we conceptualise the 
spatiality of geographical scale (see Low 1997 ). If the scales at which social 
integration and cultural engagement are modulated are no longer necessarily 
congruent with the scales of national political participation, then this might open up 
new possibilities for political action, not least at the national scale itself (Staeheli 
1999). In contrast to the assumption that political power is always exercised within a 
territorialized power-container of one scale or another, John Keane argues that the 
conceptual relationships between media and democracy should be based on a 
networked conception of political power. The power of large-scale organisations, like 
states and corporations, depends on “complex, molecular networks of everyday power 
relations” (Keane 1991: 146). This means that power is much less consolidated, 
centred, and coherent than is often supposed by areal, territorial conceptions of scale. 
And it follows that the “often uncoordinated and dispersed character of state power 
makes it more susceptible to the initiatives of social movements and citizen groups, 
backed by countervailing networks of communication, which change prevailing codes 
and practice the art of ‘divide and rule’ from below” (ibid: 144-145). In turn, Keane 
(1995: 8) suggests that the public sphere is better understood as “a complex mosaic of 
differently sized, overlapping, and interconnected public spheres”. According to a 
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networked model of space and scale, spatially extensive public networks might 
include large numbers or small numbers of people, and vice-versa. The key variable is 
the durability of networks, the extent to which they are institutionally embedded, and 
the ways they exercise influence. From this capillary perspective on power, 
conceptualisations that idealise unified and territorially bounded media publics are ill 
suited to assessing the progressive potential of contemporary transformations in the 
spatial organisation of media and communications. They underestimate the potential 
of a multiplicity of networked spaces of communicative practice to induce changes in 
organisations and political institutions. This suggests that Garnham’s either/or 
formulation of the main questions facing theories of media and democracy needs to be 
re-thought. The fundamental issue is not whether effective democratic media publics 
can be constituted at the same global level to match the jump of scale by capital and 
by administrative and regulatory authorities. The pressing question is, rather, whether 
and how actors embedded at different territorial scales are able to mobilise support 
and resources through spatially extensive networks of engagement (Cox 1998).  
To illustrate this final point about the relationships between media, politics, 
and the networked spatiality of scale, it is worth considering an example, taken from 
the process of contested media reform in post-apartheid South Africa.  Formal 
democratisation has been associated with an opening up of a previously tightly 
controlled media system to international investment, a diversification of radio and 
television outlets, increased levels of competition and commercialisation, and the 
heightened commodification of audiences. At the same time, as part of a broader 
emergent culture of transparency and public accountability, an infrastructure of 
independent media regulation has been established. These structural and 
organisational shifts have opened up new opportunities for locally embedded social 
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movements to mobilise media attention as a means of applying pressure on local, 
provincial, and national political and business elites. In particular, they have enabled 
the development of an oppositional “politics of shame”, in which grassroots 
organisations are able to mobilise mainstream media attention as a lever for bringing 
pressure to bear on powerful actors (see Barnett 2003, Chapter 7). It is not necessary 
to idealise the democratic potential of media in order to acknowledge this possibility 
that media attention can be mobilised to act upon the conduct of powerful political 
and economic actors, especially in a context such as post-apartheid South Africa, 
where both public and private organisations are publicly committed to constitutional 
government and to discourses of service delivery and institutional transformation. 
After an initial post-election lull in political mobilisation after 1994, South Africa has 
witnessed an upsurge of grassroots oppositional activism. This process if associated 
with new forms of issue-based mobilisation. These include environmental movements 
mobilising against the impacts of industrial pollution, national mobilisations around 
government policy on HIV/AIDS issues, more localised campaigns around housing, 
infrastructure, and service delivery, as well as the role of South African activist 
organisations in the broader politics of anti-globalisation campaigns. What these all 
share are two characteristics. Firstly, attracting and maintaining mainstream media 
attention has been crucial to these new forms of grassroots activism, for mobilisation 
and validation purposes, but in particular as a means of exerting pressure on powerful 
institutional actors. But secondly, dense networks of connection between South 
African based activists and organisations and wider international campaigns have 
shaped the forms of campaigns and protesting used to achieve this objective. 
Routinised Internet-based communication between locally embedded activists and 
 24 
spatially dispersed campaigns is crucial as a means of sharing information, developing 
strategy, raising funds, and borrowing discourse and repertories of protest.   
The South African experience illustrates two related issues. Firstly, the 
political significance of media and communications is not technologically determined, 
but in large part depends upon the capacity of social interests for mobilisation, 
organisation, and self-representation. Secondly, the ability of activists to organise 
political action through media spaces and communications networks is dependent on 
the politics that has been going on around the media in South Africa in this period. 
The shaping of independent regulatory authorities has become a new site through 
which citizen participation can be channelled. In South Africa in the mid-1990s, the 
politics of independent regulation saw significant successes for progressive 
organisations in embedding procedures for accountability, transparency, and public 
participation into national communications policy and law. This success has been 
pivotal in the pluralisation of media cultures and the popularisation of news agendas 
in this period. However, the ongoing internationalisation of South African 
communications policy has more recently seen the degree of participation and 
accountability curtailed by a prioritisation of investment-led regulatory principles. In 
turn, there is an emerging network of Southern African media activism, sharing 
information and expertise, and engaging in multiple policy contexts. This 
internationalisation of media reform movements underscores the point that the success 
of campaigns for the continuing democratisation of mass media within South Africa 
will be shaped by the capacity of nationally embedded actors to draw upon networks 
of support and resources that stretch beyond the confines of the nation-state. The point 
of this brief excursus on South Africa is not, then, to reiterate the cliché that new 
media and communications are rendering the nation-state irrelevant as an arena of 
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progressive political action. Quite the contrary, it is to emphasise that the real 
significance of new practices and scales of communication is still most likely to be 
found at national levels. Re-scaling the networks through which social movement 
mobilisation is organised enables the development of new forms of political action 
that are still most often articulated with scale at which citizenship rights continue to 




This chapter has argued for a reorientation of the normative geographies of media 
theory around the dual theme that space is produced and scale is networked. The 
common rhetoric about the death of distance works to hide practices of inter-
mediation from view, whether these are policies, regulatory systems, corporate 
structures, or social practices. The idea of the “production of communicative spaces” 
is meant to capture the double emphasis upon both the production of new spaces of 
communicative sociality through social practice and upon the institutional production 
of material infrastructures of communication. It underscores the sense that the social 
uses of modern communications technologies open up of new spaces of sociability 
and interaction, that transform the ways in which ordinary people engage in a wider 
world of publicly significant processes and events, as well as transforming the nature 
and meanings of those processes and events themselves. But it also reminds us that 
the social production of the spaces of communicative action needs to be supplemented 
with an analysis of the dynamics of the production of the material infrastructure of 
communication, an analysis that requires an understanding of the politically contested 
process of commodification, regulation, and policy making. Thinking of the active 
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production of communicative spaces therefore helps us keep in view the extent to 
which the politics that goes on in and around media is neither neatly contained within 
the space of a national polity, and nor is it free-floating in a weightless global space. 
Rather the politics of media citizenship involves the articulation of interests and 
subjectivities embedded at spatial scales that flow through, around, and under the 
national scale.  
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